In quantitative information flow we say that program Q is "at least as secure as" P just when the amount of secret information flowing from Q is never more than flows from P , with of course a suitable quantification of "flow". This secure-refinement order is compositional just when P Q implies C(P ) C(Q) for any context C, again with a suitable definition of "context".
Introduction
The problem of information disclosure in the context of statistical databases was formulated by Dalenius as an ideal privacy goal: "Nothing about an individual should be learnable from the database that cannot be learned without access to the database" [9] . Later he argued the infeasibility of such a strict goal; more recently Dwork [11] addressed the same concern demonstrating that whenever there is a (known) correlation between two pieces of information, anything learned about one piece implies that something might also be learned about the other. In secure programming generally, i.e. not only read-only databases, this corresponds to leaking information about a secret "high-level" variable X, which then consequentially leaks information about a different high-level variable Z that does not appear in the program at all, but is known via "auxiliary information" to be correlated with the initial value of X. Because of the generality of this programming-language perspective, we call this effect collateral leakage.
Here we study this broader phenomenon of collateral leakage in the general setting of read/write programs operating as "open systems". Because [1] studied Dalenius leakage in terms of abstract channels (read-only programs), and [22] explored the semantics of information flow for read/write programs operating as "closed systems" without external correlation, this work can be see as bringing the two together: we compute general bounds on collateral leakage for read/write open systems, and we adapt our earlier fully abstract program semantics to treat it compositionally.
The following "password" example helps to illustrate the issues. 
Changing a password: is it only "fresh", or actually "different"?
Consider the situation in Fig. 1 with state space a set {A, B, C} of just three possible one-letter passwords (to keep things simple); we assume the distribution of passwords is known, and (again for simplicity) we assume it's uniform. Now contrast two users' behaviours when forced to change their passwords: User Lax makes a fresh, uniform choice of password; User Strict however is forced to choose a different password, still uniformly but not the one he already has. In Fig. 1 both users then suffer an "over the shoulder" attack where the adversary glimpses a letter the user did not type as he logged-in with his new password.
Although it's common to consider leaks wrt. initial values, especially e.g. for channels that don't update any state anyway, in Fig. 1 instead it's very natural to focus on the final state of these two programs, i.e. the new password: the old password is not so interesting to the shoulder-cruiser. This "focus on final" obtains for the theory as well, but for a different reason: our aim (in program semantics) is to integrate security "correctness" with (ordinary) functional correctness of programs, i.e. to treat the two within the same framework [22] ; and since functional correctness (and correctness comparisons, i.e. refinement [24] ) is determined wrt. the final values a program produces, we should do the same for security correctness: more is said about this in §5.3 and its associated App. G.
The example above was deliberately constructed so that the two programs have the same final distribution: with our assumption of uniformly distributed passwords beforehand, in both cases (Lax,Strict) the new password's distribution will be uniform too. Furthermore, the effect of the leak statement is also the same: the adversary has the same knowledge about the new password in both cases -he knows exactly one value that it is not. So are these programs equivalent in terms of their functional-and information-flow behaviour?
The answer depends on the context of operation. As closed systems with a single secret X, they are indeed equivalent when the initial distribution is uniform.
1 But they are not equivalent if we consider correlations between the final value of X, the new password, and some other variable, call it Z, even though Z is not mentioned in either program. That is because to any adversary aware of that correlation, the first program will leak information about Z but the second will not: for example, if it is known that each user has the same password for their Facebook (X) and Twitter (Z) accounts, then the over-the-shoulder attack against Strict's new password leaks information about his (unchanged) Twitter password even though his program does not access Twitter at all. 2 This is essentially the Delanius scenario presented in a programming-language context where X is the statistical database and the correlation with Z is "auxiliary information" [11] except that, unlike in the traditional presentation, ours here allows the "database" (the password) to be updated. In this programming context, we call Z a collateral variable, and information flow from it is collateral leakage.
The Dalenius phenomenon, so well known in security research, is truly remarkable as collateral leakage in rigorous reasoning about programs: what kind of algebra would invalidate an equality because of variables not occurring in either formula? In Fig. 1 are two sequential programs whose treatment of all variables they mention (X) is the same in terms of assignments to those variables and leaks about them; yet the two programs are not the same if collateral variables must be considered, variables the program does not even mention.
In a collateral-enabled context, the semantics of Lax and of Strict must differ.
any row C x,− of C: X Y can be interpreted as an element of DY. Similarly the X ×Y matrix-subtype X Y is co-stochastic, a channel from Y to X with 1-summing columns. Following [23, 2] an abstract channel is a function DX →D 2 X from a prior distribution on X , i.e. of type DX , to a distribution of distributions-on-X , thus of type D(DX ), equivalently D 2 X . That latter is the type of hyper-distributions on X , or "hypers" for short. To do that, we form the joint distribution induced by the prior and the channel, but then abstract from the observations' values y: Y, retaining only the effect they have on our a-posteriori, i.e. Bayesian reasoning that revises the prior. The support of the hyper is the set of posterior distributions induced on the prior by each possible observed value y: Y, and the probability assigned by the hyper to each such posterior, i.e. each element of its support, is the (marginal) probability associated with the observation y that induced it. In more detail -given a channel C: X Y and prior π: X , the resulting hyper ∆: D 2 X is found by: constructing the joint distribution J: D(X ×Y) given by J x,y := π x C x,y ; then for each y the column J −,y normalising 4 to give the posterior induced on π by that y; and finally taking for the probability assigned to that posterior the normalising factor. We write π C for the joint distribution J and [−] for the abstraction from y, so that ∆ = [π C] describes the whole hyper-construction procedure.
As an example, in Fig. 1 , and the hyper itself is a uniform distribution on the three of them. An adversary does not know beforehand which two values afterwards he will know are possible; afterwards he does know the two possibiities, but still does not know which is right. 
Vulnerabliity induced by gain-functions
Vulnerability [2] is a generalisation of entropy (of distributions), no longer necessarily e.g. Shannon but now others more adapted for secure programming, and whose great variety allows fine-grained control of the significance of the information that might be leaked [2, 3] .
Given a state-space X , vulnerability is induced by a gain function over that space, typically g of type G W X = W→X →R, for some space of choices w: W. When W is obvious from context, or unimportant, we will omit it and write just g: GX . Given g and w (but not yet x) the function g.w is of type X →R 6 and can thus be regarded as a random variable on X . As such, it has an expected value on any distribution π over X , written E π g.w. 7 Once we have x, the (scalar) value g.w.x is simply of type R and represents the gain to an adversary if he guesses w when the secret's actual value is x. This suggests that W should simply be X , i.e. that there would be no point in guessing a w that was not in X , and indeed a particularly simple example is W=X with g.w.x = (1 if w=x else 0) so that the adversary gains 1 if he guesses correctly and 0 otherwise: we call this particular gain-function g id . However for reasons explored thoroughly elsewhere [2, 23] , there are practical advantages to allowing W to be more general. And a theoretical benefit is that it is the more general W's that allow representation of many conventional entropy functions (including even Shannon, after some encoding), thus bringing them all within the same framework [23] .
A gain function g: GX induces a g-vulnerability function V g : DX →R so that V g [π] for Π: DX is the maximum over all choices w: W of the expected value of g.w on π, that is max w (E π g.w). In the simple 1-or-0 case above, the vulnerability V g id is called the Bayes vulnerability, sometimes written just V ; it is one-minus the Bayes-Risk of Decision Theory.
Vulnerability applies also to hypers, so that V g ∆ for ∆: D 2 X is the expected value of V g over ∆, itself considered as a distribution on DX . That allows us to write the succinct V g [π C] for the a posteriori g-vulnerability of prior π through channel C. 8 
(Classical) Gain-function leakage and capacity for channels
In general, information leakage on prior π due to channel C is a comparison between the "information content" of prior knowledge about π, and of posterior knowledge after observing C's output; in particular, its precise definition depends on how the information is measured. Here we will use gain functions and speak of g-leakage (rather than e.g. the more specific Shannon leakage). The multiplicative g-leakage of C wrt prior π and gain function g is the (log 2 of the) ratio between the posterior and prior g-vulnerabilities:
The capacity of a channel is the supremum of that leakage (1), but varying in its definition depending on whether the supremum is over either gain functions, or priors or both:
it is the most robust estimation of leakage, and can always be achieved for some scenario and prior [2] .
Collateral Gain-function leakage and capacity for channels
The Z-collateral leakage of a channel C: X Y is with respect to some third space Z and is induced by knowledge of a correlation between values in X and Z. 9 We write X,Y,Z of resp. types X , Y, Z equivalently for random-or program variables, depending on context. We assume a known correlation between X and a fresh secret Z given by a joint probability distribution Π: D(Z×X ) so that leaks about X through (a computer program implementing) channel C induce "collateral" leaks about Z as follows. Define π to be the Z-marginal of Π and determine some channel The Z/Π-collateral capacity of channel C is then the upper bound of the above with respect to all gain functions, that is L ∀ ( π, ⇒ Π·C). The collateral capacity of channel C in general is then taken over all possible Z and Π. 8 Recalling that [−] around a list of one element makes the point distribution on that element, we can regard Vg [π] as the expected value of Vg on the point hyper on π, agreeing with our usage just above. 9 In Dalenius terms X is the statistical database, with queries of type Y, and the correlation between X and Z is auxiliary information [11] . 10 Recall that Πz,x is thus πz ⇒ Πz,x. Unless marginal π is full support, conditional ⇒ Π is not unique. But it does not matter: any choice suffices, and does not affect the outcome.
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Collateral gain-function leakage and capacity for HMM's
HMM's as models for leaking probabilistic programs
The discussion in §2, for channels only, corresponds to considering read-only programs. With Hidden Markov Models we combine channels and Markov transitions between initial-and final states (e.g. over variables X in X ), thus modelling read/write programs; and the constructions of §2 carry over. A Markov transition is described by a matrix M say so that M x,x is the probability that initial state x will result in final state x . An HMM-step then comprises a channel and a transition together, but acting independently on the initial state: we call C its channel and M markov (lower case), and write it (C:M ) of type X Y×X . Defined 
and note that it is again stochastic, but no longer necessarily a step -its outputs y 2 and x might be correlated even for a single input x. Because of that, sequential compositions are strictly more general than the HMM -steps built directly from (C:M ) -that is, for
in general there is not necessarily a single C, M such that ( 
The induced channel of an HMM
Recall that an HMM of type X Y×X takes an initial state in X to a final state (also) in X and leaks observations in Y along the way, where "along the way" is more general than channels: in Fig. 1 for example the leak statement occurred after a Markov update. Collateral leakage however, as we saw in the previous section, is with respect to a value Z which the HMM (or program) does not even mention: it neither reads nor updates it; the programmer has never even heard of it. But it is somehow correlated with the initial state: that being so, we show how to isolate the channel part of an HMM, combining all its leaks and ignoring its final state. Fix H as some HMM of type X Y×X below. n of the H n just before -we can abstract only at the very end. In the special case however where each H n is an HMM -step (C n :M n ), the calculation of the effective channel can be somewhat decomposed. We give an example of such a calculation in §4 (fast exponentiation for cryptography).
Lemma 3. Let H be an HMM and (
On the other hand, if we want to compute only the collateral capacity, we can obtain at least an upper bound at considerably less cost, without the need to compute chn.H exactly.
The following provides an upper bound for L ∀ (∀, chn.H), and requires only linear resources.
Lemma 4. For any
H with the stochastic matrix M (on rhs) treated as a channel.
In fact Lem. 4 provides a very robust estimate of the collateral capacity of an HMM, since it does not mention Z or the correlating Π. And it is the best possible general bound, achieving equality for some examples, e.g. Fig. 1 . It is also easy to calculate since for any channel we have from [2] 
, where Υ X is the uniform prior on X . On the other hand, the bound can be very conservative; we provide an example in App. C.
In cases where we know the correlation Π (and thus Z), we can compute the collateral capacity by identifying the gain function that achieves the extremal value in Def. 2. 
This shows that it is possible to construct the gain-function that maximizes the collateral capacity, and allows its exact calculation. Moreover, it also shows that the collateral capacity of H wrt. Z can be understood as regular g-leakage of H wrt. the initial state of X . The next theorem is more general, and gives an upper bound over all possible correlations: it is determined by the extremal leakage of the initial prior π: DX , thus easy to calculate [1] . Although our state comprises B,E,P,D,R we concentrate only on the secrecy of E. In particular, we are not trying to discover B or P in this case; and D,R are of no external significance afterwards anyway.
Figure 2 Defence against side channel analysis in exponentiation
Note that when X,Z are completely correlated, i.e. when ⇐ Π and ⇒ Π are both the identity, the inequality in Thm. 6 becomes equality.
Example: Collateral damage from leaky cryptography
Keys for public-key cryptography are best if independent; but recently [17] discovered an unexpected sharing of the prime numbers used to generate them. Thus information leaked while using one secret key to encrypt a message, even if the message itself remains secure, could cause collateral leakage wrt. some other key elsewhere and so put future encryptions at risk -even if they are at another site apparently having no connection to the first. That motivates our example here, the collateral leakage from a fast-exponentiation algorithm. Fig. 2 implements fast exponentiation with a random choice of divisor that defends against a side channel that leaks program flow (of a conditional) [28] . Since the program code is public, that leak is effectively of whether divisor D exactly divides the current value of E, which value is steadily decreased by the update at the end of each iteration: thus additional information is leaked every time. In the standard (and fastest) algorithm the divisor D is always 2, but that ultimately leaks E's initial value exactly, one bit (literally) on each iteration. The final value of E is always zero, of no significance; but its initial value represents collateral leakage about subsequent use of this same key (obviously), but also the use of other apparently unrelated keys elsewhere [17] . The obfuscating defence is to vary the choice of D unpredictably from one iteration to the next, choosing it secretly from some set D, here {2, 3, 5} although other options are possible. The divisor D itself is not leaked.
We modelled the loop as a sequential composition of HMM -steps for a fixed number of iterations and used Lem. 3 to construct a channel that captures the leakage of information about the initial state of the program. Although our calculation is wrt. the uniform prior on E, and even though we do not know the extent of any correlation between this key E and others used elsewhere, by using the "Miracle Theorem" [2, Thm 5.1], we can bound the maximum leakage about the initial value of E with the min-capacity of such a channel. Furthermore, by relying on Thm. 6 we can see that this min-capacity can also be used as a bound on the collateral leakage with respect to any other secret that might be correlated to E.
Detailed calculations are in App. D. Our Tbl. 1 confirms that the larger the divisor set D, the less effective is the side channel; and the protection is increased with more bits for E. Note that in the case D={2} the whole secret E is leaked.
As explained at end §2.3, that Lg id gives the upper bound L ∀ for all vulnerabilities. 
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The abstract semantics of "collateral aware" HMM's
Bits-leaked vs. a partial order on information-flow
We now contrast our practical example in §4, just above, with our earlier treatment of passwords, in particular our description (at the end of §2.1) of leakage abstractly as a hyper-distribution rather than as a number of bits (Tbl. 
now a uniform hyper over three, different, skewed inners:
example, is the distribution A wprob (with probability) 1 /2 and B,C wprob 1 /4 each. 11 An adversary, knowing the program text of Strict and having calculated this hyper would conclude that, with probability 1 /3 each, he can after the run of the program revise his knowledge of the initial-password distributions from uniform to one of these three skewed inners (although he does not know beforehand which one of those three possible revisions will eventuate).
Abstracting from any particular vulnerability (or entropy), we conclude that although Lax and Strict are equivalent wrt their setting and security of the new password when the previous password was uniformly distributed ( §1.1), wrt collateral security Strict is less secure than Lax. This abstract conclusion, i.e. reached without calculating specifics of "number of bits leaked", comes from the "no less secure than" partial order ( ) on hypers
, that is the lhs-hyper is strictly less secure than the rhs-hyper [19, 2, 21, 1, 23, 22] . The significance is that the theory associated with ( ) shows that for any hypers ∆ 1,2 we have ∆
) for all gain-functions g: increased security corresponds to decreased vulnerability [1] . Since gain functions can express not only Bayes Vulnerability but also Shannon entropy (with some encoding) and many other entropies besides, that is a very strong result: for any "favourite entropy" you might use to compare the security of two programs, if it is expressible as V g for some g (no matter how bizarre) then you will find the former at least as secure as the latter. (3) it is 2 /3, increasing as expected.
Collateral-aware fully-abstract semantics of HMM's
All proofs for this section are to be found in App. F.
We saw in §2.1 an abstract semantics for (read only) channels in DX →D 2 X ; we could summarise that by writing [ 
.π) for all such g's and π: DX ; and behavioural equivalence to be refinement in both directions. We say that (concrete) HMM 's are behaviourally equivalent just when their (abstract) denotations are. Because refinement is anti-symmetric [19, 1] that establishes full abstraction of [[·] ] for that equivalence on concrete HMM 's. A basic compositionality result is then that Def. 8 respects this equivalence (Thm. 14).
A second basic compositionality result concerns state extension: an HMM acting on state X , i.e. on a single variable X, can be also considered to be acting on part of a larger state Z×X with an extra Z (whether correlated or not). Even if the program does not read or write Z, it nevertheless can release information about Z: this is the essence of the collateral "problem". The two programs leak X; X:= 0 and simply X:= 0 make it clear that the final-state semantics is insufficient for the extension: those two programs both take any π: DX to the same final hyper [ [0] ], that X is "certainly 0". Yet in the context X := Z; (−) they are different: one reveals Z and the other does not.
Definition 9. Given abstract h we define its
in two steps. 13 First, we construct h X ×Z 2 as in Fig. 3 to produce function a function of
2 that carries the initial value of X as well as two copies of Z.
12 Our earlier domain was DX D 2 X , as is still the case for channels since do not update their state. 13 We now drop the X primes, to reduce clutter.
At left: Given a collateral correlation Π: D(Z×X ) let the induced collateral channel Z: Z X and X -prior π: DX be such that Π = Z π, that is so that Πz,x = Zz,xπx.
At right (in grey):
For an initial/final distribution δ: D(X ×X ), the leftmultiplication Z·δ produces a distribution in D(Z×X ), just as matrix multiplication would.
At right (in black):
The D-lifting (push forward) of the multiplication (Z·) thus takes an initial-final hyper in
Summary: A collateral Z is linked to our state X by joint distribution Π: D(Z×X ). This Π can be decomposed into its right marginal π: X on our state space, and a collateral channel Z: Z X between it and Z, i.e a right conditional of Π. (Right-conditionals are not necessarily unique; but the variation on x's where π.x=0 does not affect D(Z·) at right (Lem. 11).
Although our abstract h at bottom can "see" only X and prior π, it can have a collateral effect on Z, given by the "Z-lifting" h Z shown at top. Note that h Z is not itself an abstract HMM.
Note that we re-order the set arguments of the D's up to commutativity. Then we define the "duplicator" ζ:
, and conclude with h ×Z being h
Our principal result (proved in App. F) is then
for every extension Z.
It is the only if of this theorem that shows the extended semantics DX → D 2 X 2 is enough to allow Z-extension, i.e. that our semantics is compositional even in collateral contexts.
Justifying REFINEMENT DENIED due to collateral g-vulnerability
The definition in §5.1 of secure-program refinement looks very strong, mandating a decrease of g-vulnerability for all gain-functions g. Why is it not too strong?
A key result of [19] was that is indeed not too strong in closed systems, provided one accepts Bayes vulnerability as a reasonable security measure [26] , and compositionality as reasonable property of program semantics.
14 The argument was that if some general vulnerability V g , no matter how bizarre, mandates P Q for two programs P, Q (i.e. REFINEMENT DENIED), then there will be a context C and a prior π such that for that π the Bayes vulnerability of C(P ), which is not bizarre at all, is strictly less than that of C(Q). In [19] the distinguishing g was used to construct a Markov update M g acting on P, Q's final state, based on that g, so that P ; M g and Q; M g were distinguished by the simpler Bayes vulnerability V g id . But our programs Lax,Strict from Fig. 1 are not distinguished by any g in a closed system: only in an open system, with possible collateral variable Z, do we have Lax Strict. That means the technique of [19] will not work here, because no g acting on X , the final state alone, can distinguish the two programs: they produce the same hyper on X . (Recall † in §5.1.) To make an analogous argument we instead use a collateral-aware g on X ×X to construct a collateral correlation Π g between Z=W and X ; it is then the presence of the induced collateral variable W that allows us to deny the refinement. We can then argue that indeed Lax should not be refined by Strict, because in the presence of correlation Π g between W and Z that refinement can be denied on the basis of Bayes vulnerability acting on W alone. We give more details in App. G.
Related work; conclusions
Classical analyses of quantitative information flow assume that the secret does not change, and early approaches to measuring insecurities in programs are based on determining a "change in uncertainty" of some "prior" value of the secret -although how to measure the uncertainty differs in approach. For example Clark et al [6] use Shannon entropy to estimate the number of bits being leaked; and Clarkson et al [8] model a change in belief. The role of capacity when the prior is not known was stressed by Chatzikokolakis et al [4] . Smith [26] demonstrated the importance of using measures which have some operational significance, and this idea was developed further [2] by introducing the notion of g-leakage to express leakage wrt. very general contexts. The partial order used here on HMM 's is the same as the g-leakage order introduced by Alvim et al [2] , but it also appeared in even earlier work [19] . Its properties have been studied extensively [1] .
More recently Marzdiel et al [18] have analysed information flow of dynamic secrets using a model based on probabilistic automata. This reflects a view that in computing systems secrets are not necessarily static; our work [19, 22] addresses this idea by providing semantic domains for programs where secrets can change.
Clark et al [7] give techniques for static analysis of quantitative information flow based on Shannon entropy for a small while-language. Extended HMM 's for modelling side channels have been explored by Karlof and Wagner [16] and Green et al [14] for e.g. key recovery. In §4 our quantitative capacity bounds on side channels are valid even for collateral leakage. The abstract treatment of probabilistic systems with the introduction of a "refinement order" was originally due to Jones and Plotkin [15] ; the ideas were extended to include demonic nondeterminism (as well as probability) by us [25] . In both cases the order (on programs) corresponds to an order determined by averaging over "probabilistic predicates" which are random variables over the state space. The first compositional refinement order for information flow appeared in [19] for security programs expressed in a simple programming language and in [1] for a channel model of information flow. Prospects and future work. In [22] we noted that collateral leakage has a significant impact on abstract-program semantics for quantitative information flow; in this paper we have defined a novel collateral-aware HMM -style model (Def. 8) that properly takes it into account. The significance of the abstract models in this paper is that even though information flow becomes apparent only in a wider context of collateral leakage, our abstract semantics Def. 8 and Thm. 10 together show that programs can still be compared using only the variables they actually declare in their source code.
An analogue of Thm. 10 for qualitative information flow appeared in Chen's thesis [5] where compositional refinement checking for two programs is reduced to comparisons involving only the declared variables. The benefit of this theorem can be seen in Chen's automation of refinement checking for qualitative information flow. Our general result Thm. 10 holds out the prospect of similar automation for quantitative-security refinement checking. 
A Summary of terms and notations
These entries list in first-use order the points at which notation is introduced during the exposition: a detailed explanation of each is given there.
collateral leakage Leakage from data to which a program does not refer. p.1 X (Fig. 1 Lax may choose any new password, uniformly, including his current; but Strict must change his password, again uniformly. In both cases the distribution of the new X is again uniform: for Lax it is independent of X's initial value; but for Strict is is correlated. Both users, in the second statement, suffer an "over the shoulder" attack against the new password. 
B.1 Elementary models
For convenience we repeat the programs of Fig. 1 , in Fig. 4 here. Variable X in the program text ranges over the state space X = {A, B, C}. We begin by modelling its components in the simplest mathematical way, i.e. conventionally with probabilistic updates being Markov matrices in X X and leaks being channel matrices in X Y, where in this simple example Y=X . We then map those different descriptions into the same framework of HMM -steps, their types becoming X → Y×X , for varying Y (sometimes X itself, and sometimes the unit type {•}); and finally we use their sequential compositions to get the HMM descriptions of the two programs Lax and Strict.
The first statement X:∈ [A,B,C] of Lax corresponds to a Markov matrix in X X with the input at left and output at top:
For Lax the input is ignored; the output is a uniform choice over X .
However the first statement X:∈ [X + ,X − ] of Strict corresponds this Markov matrix instead:
For Strict the output is a uniform choice over anything but the input.
The second statement X:∈ [A,B,C] in both cases corresponds to a channel matrix in X Y, where in fact Y=X because the observables are of the same type as the state:
The over-the-shoulder leak is uniformly any value not equal to the current state.
B.2 Elementary models make HMM steps
To build the two programs from their components, we must convert those components to HMM steps: note that although the components are all matrices, Markov matrices and channels are converted in different ways. We start with the conversion of the markovs: converted from X X to the HMM -type X Y×X they become
where e.g. the label •A means the y, x pair (•, A) -the observable is "unit", the single element of the unit type {•}, and the new state is A because, these markovs' being leak-free, they (in effect) have no observables (equivalently, one always observes the same thing, the •, so no information flows).
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Conversion of the channel(s) does however leak information, giving in both cases 
B.3 Sequential composition of HMM-steps
To get the HMM representation of the two programs, we use the definition of HMM sequential composition (2) in §3.1, which we repeat here for convenience: For Strict the result is this HMM, this time using Strict's H 1 (and again the common H 2 ):
For Strict the rows are not identical, because the first HMM -step updates the state in a way dependent on its incoming value. 15 In the notation of App. E they would be (:M L1 ) and (:M S1 ), both of HMM -type X {•}×X . 16 In the notation of App. E this would be (C 2 :) of HMM -type X Y×X where, recall in fact Y=X 17 The Cartesian product {•}×Y is isomorphic to Y alone: we have HMM -composed X {•}×X and X Y×X to get X ({•}×Y)×X , isomorphically X Y×X .
B.4 The semantic view: hypers for Lax
We are now interested in the hypers produced by each of the two HMM 's just above when they are applied to the uniform prior [A, B, C] that assigns probability 1 /3 to each of A,B,C, an assumption we have made for this example). We do Lax first: the joint distribution in 
If we project (5) A, A, B, C ], [ A, B, B, C ], [ A, B, C 
which we constructed just by erasing the second component of each pair in (6) . The "uniform distribution" with repeated components in the list gives proportionally more probability to the repetitions: written in the conventional way, for (7) we would get
which is indeed the same as (3) in §5.1 above.
B.6 The semantics of composition, and relative security
The above constructions started from Markov-and channel matrices, converted them into HMM -step matrices, and then sequentially composed those matrices according to (4) . The semantic alternative is to take the denotations at the very beginning, i.e. the abstract HMM 's corresponding to the individual program fragments, and then to compose them according to the semantic definition at Def. 
C Proofs for §3

Proof for Lem. 3 [from §3.2]
Let H be an HMM and (C:M ) an HMM -step. Then
x,y 2 is parallel composition of channels. The M cannot be discarded, since it affects the prior of the "tail" H of the sequential composition.
Proof. We prove each equality independently:
"Parallel composition"
Proof for Lem. 4 [from §3.2]
For any H let CCap.H be defined
H where we interpret the stochastic matrix M (rhs) as a channel.
Proof. We use induction in the number of HMM -steps of H. Base case: H has only one step.
Inductive step: assume the lemma is true for HMM 's composed of n steps. Let H = (C:M ); H , where H has n steps. Hidden variable xs is set initially uniformly at random over the four possible arrays of length two having 0, 1 entries. Next the array values are all flipped (probability 2/3) or all left alone (probability 1/3); afterwards the value of either the first or second bit is leaked, but only the value is observed. Finally xs is updated again.
We model this as three HMM basic steps : H:= (:M 1 ); (C 2 :); (:M 2 ), where M 1 corresponds to the first update of xs, C 2 corresponds to the leak statement and M 2 the last update of xs. But from App. E we can combine the second and third, writing it as just the two steps (:M 1 ); (C 2 :M 2 ). Applying Lem. 4 we find
"Identity channel leaks nothing; Lem. 4" We compute the values of the relevant matrices as follows:
Finally we compute the leakages:
Hence CCap. H = 1. However we can get an exact computation of leakage by calculating chn.H exactly via Lem. 3, which gives
So finally we have L ∀ (∀, chn.H) = lg((1/6 + 1/6)4) = lg(4/3) = 0.415, which is considerably less than CCap. H.
Proof for Thm. 5 [from §3.2]
Given H and Π: D(Z×X ) with π, π resp. the marginals of Π on Z, X , define conditional ⇒ Π as in §2.4, there existsĝ:
Proof. Let a:= min z: X , πz>0 π z , that is, a is the minimum non-zero probability in π. The first equality follows from [1] [Theorem 10], withĝ.z .z = a/ π z , whenever z = z and π z > 0, and is zero otherwise. We prove the second equality as follows. Let C:= chn.H and let
Proof for Thm. 6 [
from §3.2]
Given H and Π as above, we have
where π, ⇒ Π are as defined in Thm. 5, and Υ X is the uniform probability distribution over X .
Proof.
It is enough to show the following:
The first inequality follows from the right capacity bound from [1, Cor 23] ; the equality then follows from [1, Thm 10] . Although our state comprises B,E,P,D,R we concentrate only on the secrecy of E. In particular, we are not trying to discover B or P in this case; and D,R are of no external significance afterwards anyway. In this section give the details of the leakage calculations for the example from §4. For convenience we repeat the program at Fig. 5 . The well-known fast method of computing B E from a base B exponent E is a to employ a "divide and conquer" method to avoid the exponential time taken to perform E multiplications. But in the most straightforward implementations, side-channels can reveal whether the current value of the exponent was decremented or divided by two, effectively revealing the exponent's bits one-by-one from least-to most significant. In cryptographic applications, this reveals the secret key [28] .
A defence against that is to vary unpredictably the divisor that decreases the exponent on each iteration: not always 2, but say sometimes 3 and sometimes 5. This makes the algorithm (slightly) less efficient but, in compensation, much complicates the side-channel analysis that in the 2-case reveals everything. The code in Fig. 5 shows how: a fresh random divisor D is chosen from a fixed set D, independently each time round the loop; in Fig. 5 we use D = {2, 3, 5}. (The original, insecure algorithm uses D={2}.) Since a higher divisor offers more security, but takes longer to compute, the precise choice of D can be thought of as selecting a trade-off between information leakage and performance. assume pessimistically that the observer can learn whether or not the statement P := P * BˆR was executed, which logically is equivalent to observing the evaluation of the guard R! = 0 of the if statement. We model this flow as a an HMM comprising a deterministic channel C and a Markov M P . C outputs, for each state (B, E, P, D, R), whether R is 0 or not. The (also deterministic) Markov part M P updates the state (B, E, P, D, R) to (B, E, PB R , D, R) only when R =0, otherwise the state remains unchanged. Finally, the last two assignments correspond to deterministic Markov updates M B and M E , mapping a state (B, E, P, D, R) to (B D , E, P, D, R) and (B, E div D, P, D, R) respectively.
We can express the program of Fig. 2 using the HMM -step notations from §3.1, whose good behaviour in representing our intentions is justified in App. E. However, the exact number of iterations depends on the initial value of E. To simplify the analysis we will always assume a fixed number of iterations (equal to the minimum number of iterations required for the program to yield the right result in every case). For instance, if E can take values from 0 to 15 (4 bits), then the maximum number of iterations is 4: on each iteration, E is divided at least by 2, and therefore after 4 iterations the value of E is guaranteed to be 0. ("Extra iterations", i.e. when E is already zero, have no effect.) Once we have an HMM, say H, we can calculate chn.H using Lem. 3 and, once we have chn.H, we can calculate its min-leakage. From Thm. 6, that gives also Dalenius leakage, which in this case represents the leakage related to the initial value of E. Tbl. 1 shows the result of computing this leakage for different sets of divisors.
E Some notations and properties of HMM steps [used in App. D]
In §3.1 it was remarked that the single, uniform definition of (;) for HMM 's "essentially" treats pure markovs and pure channels differently. That difference is possible because markovs and channels are encoded differently within HMM 's. First we give the details for classical HMM 's; then further below we address abstract HMM 's. The degenerate channel that leaks nothing about X can be regarded as having an anonymous singleton set as its observations, a single-column matrix containing only 1's. We write it nc X for "no channel" on state-space X ; usually we omit the X . The degenerate markov that makes no change is the identity (matrix) on X , which we write id X . We abbreviate (nc:M ) by (:M ) and (C:id) by (C:), calling them (as HMM 's) pure channels and pure markovs, and we note these properties of composition:
1. (C:); (:M ) = (C:M ) , i.e. that (C:M ) is equivalent to "just C" and then "just M ".
x,y 2 is the parallel composition of its constituents, i.e. that "C 1 and then C 2 " is the same as C 1 and C 2 together because C 1 passes the state on, unchanged, to C 2 .
(:M
, where M 1 ·M 2 is the (usual) Markov composition of its constituents, i.e. matrix multiplication.
The HMM -composition of pure channels and composition of pure markovs is what allows us to combine channels and markovs and then treat them with the same definition of sequential composition, as is done in App. D with one long (associative) sequential composition of the loop body's constituents, then unfolded as explained there to eliminate the loop: their different purposes are automatically respected.
The essential property referred to in Def. 8 of §5.2 guarantees that this same respect for markovs' difference from channels is achieved in the semantic domain as well. Using [21, 22] this can be exploited to remain entirely in the semantic domain, including the loop explicitly without having to unfold it.
F
Proofs and materials supporting §5 A common technique in semantics is to identify characteristic properties of denotations, which can then lead to further insights. They are expressed in semantic terms, as we did for example in [22, VIIA] for collateral-unaware abstract HMM 's, calling them "healthiness conditions". 20 An advantage of that is the possible discovery of more general properties that secure computations' (semantics) should have. Although we do not introduce collateral-aware healthiness here, it is a clear target for future work.
Proofs of lemmas and theorems
[from §5.2]
Lemma 11 shows that h Z in Fig. 3 is well defined whenever h= [[H] ] for some H. The principal fact is that possible variation in the choice of the right-conditional Z, at left, does not affect the value produced by D(Z·) at right.
Lemma 11. Let h be an abstract HMM; then h
Z from Fig. 3 is well defined. [from §5.2]
Proof. Let h=[[H]]
for some H: X Y×X , and let Π be a joint distribution in D(Z×X ) with right marginal π: DX and Z: Z X a right-conditional so that Π=Z π. If Z is unique, then the result is trivial because h Z .Π is given by the composition of the bottom-and right-hand arrows acting on π in Fig. 3 .
If however Z is not unique, it can only be at elements x where π x is 0, the well known issue that the all-zero column Π −,x cannot be normalised: but equally well known is that "it doesn't matter" because any arbitrary value chosen for Z −,x will be multiplied by 0 in Π=Z π.
It doesn't matter on the right, either, because a property of abstract h's inherited from their originating H's is that if π.x=0 then the sub-vector (π H) x,−,− of the joint distribution π H is all zero; that means, in turn, that in all inners δ of the hyper [π H] derived from that joint distribution (by abstracting from y) the probability δ x,x for that x, and for for any x , will be zero as well. Thus, again, variation of Z at that x does not matter.
In all cases,
holds whenever Π=Z π. 20 A conspicuous example of this is Dijkstra's healthiness conditions for predicate transformers on sequential programs: the principal one was conjunctivity. Originally [10] Dijkstra proved by structural induction over program texts that all program denotations were healthy; later researchers instead used healthiness to characterise a subspace of predicate transformers, and then proved that all programs' denotations lay within it -the same proof, but a different point of view. That more semantic view allowed later the expansion of healthiness, to include e.g. miracles and angelic choice, which in turn lead to new programming-language features that could denote the members of the expanded set. For the diagram in Fig. 6 -(a)(inner-average), it suffices to show Fig. 6 -(c) commutes because D-lifting preserves commutative diagrams. This essentially follows from the linearity of (Z·). Let us first recall the definition of multiplication in the Giry monad. Given a (polish) space S and a Borel set O⊆S, the multiplication µ S is defined by the expected value of the evaluation function O : DS→R where O .δ = δ.O for every δ: DS. We have, for every ∆:
We simply write s when O is the singleton {s}. Recall also that given a measurable function f : R→S, the push-forward of f by D is Df : DR→DS where, for every Borel set O⊆S and measure δ: DR, we have
A very useful result links the constructor D with integrals. Let f : R→S and g: S→R be measurable functions and δ: DR be a Borel measure. We know that Df.δ∈DS so we can integrate g wrt it. In fact, Giry has proven in [13, Sec. 3 p.70] that
We are now ready to prove that all diagrams in Fig. 6 commute. For Fig. 6 -(c), let ∆:
be an arbitrary hyper and (z, x ): Z×X . On the one hand,
On the other hand, we have
Thus, it remains to show that the integrands in the last lines of the reasoning above are the same. Let δ: DX 2 , we have
Hence, Fig. 6 -(c) commutes and its D-lift gives the inner-average commutative diagram. We now prove that 
As before, it remains to show that the integrands are equal. For every hyper ∆: DX 2 , we have
This concludes that Fig. 6-( 
where the normalisation constant is defined as in §2.1:
On the other hand, let us have a look at the inners of 
for some observations y 1,2 . Hence as required.
Now, we can prove Thm. 14. had Bayes vulnerabilities in particular "the wrong way around", i.e. that V g id (∆ P ) < V g id (∆ Q ). That justified the failure of refinement, for if P Q then we cannot, for any prior and R, have that Q; R is more Bayes vulnerable than P ; R.
Proof of
That argument does not however work directly for refinements that are rejected because of collateral correlations: the post-composing R does not have access to the initial states of P, Q if those programs modify the state. A very direct (and somewhat brutal) work-around would be to re-use the construction of [19] by putting P, Q into a context that preserved the input by first copying it into Z say, then executing P, Q resp. and finally introducing an R as before but one that operated not on X directly but rather on the preserved copy held in Z. Because neither of P, Q assign to Z, it would still contain X's original value; but leaks in P, Q from X would be reflected in different hypers D 2 (Z×X ) resulting from each. That is, informally we would have a collateral context containing declaration var Z:X and the code Z := X; P ; R Z and Z := X; Q; R Z , where R Z is the distinguishing R from [19] but operating on Z instead of X. A more convincing approach however is to use the gain function g that distinguishes P, Q to make a "pre" collateral correlation Π g instead of a "post" assignment R g . It has been shown that the Π g can be derived from the R g ; but a more direct route is the following. Assume the programs P, Q are indistinguishable wrt. the hypers on their final states (else we could simply appeal to [19] ), but that they differ wrt. their information-flow effect on the initial state. Using chn from Lem. 3 in §3.2, take chn.P and chn.Q, the effective channels of P, Q resp. and let ∆ P , ∆ Q resp. be the hypers resulting from the action of those channels respectively on the prior π. By assumption ∆ P ∆ Q , and so there is some gain-function g with V g (∆ P ) < V g (∆ Q ). It is shown in [27], but considering only channels (not HMM -programs), that there is indeed a collateral correlation Π g : D(W×X ) such that
where [Π g · chn.P ] is the hyper resulting from the joint distribution in D(W×Y) formed by the matrix multiplication of the joint distribution Π g by the stochastic chn.P . Thus we have shown that if the g-vulnerabilities of chn.P and chn.Q wrt. some g: W→X →R and π: DX mandate P Q, then the collateral Bayes vulnerabilities of P, Q are the wrong way around for some collateral correlation Π g (whose right-marginal is of course π); general g-discsimination is again, as in [19] , reduced to Bayes-vulnerability discrimination and compositionality.
